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A substantial minority of patients with terminal illness hold unrealistically hopeful beliefs
about the severity of their disease or the nature of its treatment, considering therapy as
curative rather than palliative. We propose that this attitude may be understood as self-
deception, following the current psychological theories about this topic. In this article
we suggest that the reason these patients deceive themselves is to preserve their belief
systems. According to some philosophical accounts, the human belief system (HBS) is
constituted as a web with a few stable central nodes – deep-seated beliefs – intimately
related with the self. We hypothesize that the mind may possess defensive mechanisms,
mostly non-conscious, that reject certain sensory inputs (e.g., a fatal diagnosis) that may
undermine deep-seated beliefs. This interpretation is in line with the theory of cognitive
dissonance. Following this reasoning, we also propose that HBS-related self-deception
would entail a lower cognitive load than that associated with confronting the truth:
whereas the latter would engage a myriad of high cognitive functions to re-configure
crucial aspects of the self, including the setting of plans, goals, or even a behavioral
output, the former would be mostly non-conscious. Overall, we believe that our research
supports the hypothesis that in cases of terminal illness, (self-)deceiving requires less
effort than accepting the truth.
Keywords: deception, cognitive dissonance, cognitive load, personal identity, self
INTRODUCTION
A substantial minority of terminally ill patients hold the belief that either the severity of their
disease or the nature of its treatment will lead to their recovery. This perspective article proposes
that such cases can be considered as self-deception; furthermore, we propose that the unwillingness
to accept the reality of their condition entails a lower cognitive load than accepting the truth,
due to the activation of the human belief system (HBS) defensive mechanisms. We begin by
considering the likelihood of self-deception as a special case of deception theories, and we discuss
whether holding out false hope in this context may be contemplated as self-deception. Then, we
explore current proposals of HBS function to explicate how the HBS may promote self-deception.
Finally, we consider why its activation can lead to a lessening of cognitive load in life-threatening
circumstances. In light of these considerations, we suggest that physicians should understand the
values and beliefs of patients to opt for the best strategy: whether to promote personal autonomy
or to allow self-deception.
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TERMINAL PATIENTS AND
SELF-DECEPTION
Most patients want to know the exact prognosis of their illness.
However, in speciﬁc circumstances such as in the terminal
stages of a cancer or in a severe degenerative disease, a
substantial minority (between 15 and 25%) prefer not to be told
(Schattner and Tal, 2002). In some cases, these preferences are
usually accompanied by unrealistic but more hopeful beliefs. For
example, nearly 70% of advanced oncological patients reported
understanding that chemotherapy will likely cure their cancer,
despite the physicians’ eﬀorts to convey the signiﬁcance of their
illness and treatment (Weeks et al., 2012). These data empirically
support what has already been long known, the existence of an
emotional stage of denial (Kübler-Ross, 1969; Mackillop et al.,
1988; Gattellari et al., 1999). We propose that this psychological
attitude of terminal patients can be understood as self-deception,
as we elaborate below.
Weeks et al. (2012) article, for example, reports that most
oncological patients think that chemotherapy will cure their
cancer despite physician indications to the contrary. While
this may reﬂect simply miscommunication between doctor and
patient (The et al., 2001; Lee Char et al., 2010) a substantial
factor rests in the unwillingness to accept such news. In fact,
Weeks et al. (2012) suggest that “patients perceive physicians as
better communicators when they convey a more optimistic view
of chemotherapy.” In other words, these patients may deceive
themselves by biasing the source of information. Smith and
Longo (2012) consider that the results of Weeks et al. (2012)
may be due jointly to ineﬀective communication, together with
self-deception. Following this line, Mitera et al. (2012) report
that 15% of patients with advanced cancer believed radiotherapy
will cure their disease, and 45% of them believed that the
technique would prolong their lives, even after being included in
an information program. In summary, these articles show that
self-deception, although it may not be the only factor, contributes
to the distorted view that terminal patients have about their
condition.
von Hippel and Trivers (2011) propose that self-deception
is an evolutionary resource to improve interpersonal deception.
For this reason, both deception and self-deception are closely
related and share some similar features. In the mainstream
research on deception (see, for example, Bond and DePaulo,
2006), the deceiver is required to hold in mind two diﬀerent
representations of reality, truth and falsehood, either of
which can be communicated. This view, however, has been
challenged by McCornack’s Information Manipulation Theory
(IMT) and IMT2, which proposes that a lie other than a
“bald-faced lie” is possible, and less challenging, by altering
the expectations of the listener in terms of quantity, quality,
manner and relevance of the message (McCornack, 1992;
McCornack et al., 2014), without the need to keep two
accounts in mind. The classical account of self-deception
admits of a similar dichotomous paradigm: the truth is
stored in the unconscious whereas the false discourse is
consciously available (Gur and Sackeim, 1979). Like McCornack
(1992), von Hippel and Trivers (2011) challenge the side
by side information view and propose other mechanisms
of self-deception, including bias-information search strategies,
biased interpretive processes, or biased memory processes.
Another classical feature of (self-)deception that has been
challenged by these authors is volition. In short, following
the mainstream lines of research, we could say that deception
is produced at two diﬀerent times: an a priori intention-
to-deceive event and an a posteriori act-of-deception one.
Therefore, the deceiver’s will to deceive is a necessary condition.
McCornack (1992) argues that volition is substituted as the
primary causal antecedent of deception by information: “When
people possess information that they deem too problematic
to disclose, they will deceive”. Moreover, von Hippel and
Trivers (2011) defend that self-deception should exist at both
conscious and unconscious levels when individuals deceive
themselves; they suggest that information bias strategies are
not necessarily intentional. In our opinion, these characteristics
of (self-)deception support the understanding of terminal
patients’ high expectations as such. Paraphrasing the previous
sentence by McCornack et al. (2014), when people possess
information that they deem too problematic to disclose
to themselves, they will deceive themselves. Moreover, it is
plausible that terminal patients adopt biased information search
strategies, in which information may even be consciously
suppressed (visiting doctors who look more optimistic about
their prognosis), biased interpretive processes (convincing
themselves that chemotherapy will cure their disease), or biased
memory processes (misremembering facts that the doctor did
not say).
Alternatively, one could argue that self-deception is not
comparable with deception because it lacks a behavioral output.
For example, according to Levine’s (2014) Truth-Default Theory,
deception may include self-deception so long as the message
has a deceptive purpose, even if it is unconscious. In the
present article, we do not discuss whether self-deception
always ends up in interpersonal deception, although it is
unquestionable that sometimes it is so. In any case, we
believe that the three strategies described by von Hippel
and Trivers (2011) suggest that such behavioral output (i.e.,
telling a lie) is not necessary for self-deception in some
cases. Biased strategies may be understood as mental acts
(Anscombe, 1957). For example, according to Mack et al.
(2007), some parents of children with cancer are unable to
assimilate speciﬁcally the relevant information about the fatal
prognosis, a fact that may be related with volition and the
unconscious mind. Although it may sound provocative, such
psychological reactions could be labeled as non-conscious self-
deceptions. Other authors have proposed that a behavioral
output is not a must of self-deception. In a recent empirical
study, Chance et al. (2015) state that self-deception can
allow people to hold preferred beliefs, regardless of the
truth. They exemplify self-deception citing Mele (2001): “stock
examples of self-deception, both in popular thought and in
the literature, feature people who falsely believe – in the
face of strong evidence to the contrary – that their spouses
are not having aﬀairs (. . .) or that they themselves are not
seriously ill”.
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THE ROLE OF THE HBS IN HUMAN
IDENTITY
What could be the goal of denying the imminence of one’s
own death? One of the common answers that we can ﬁnd in
the recent medical literature is keeping hope alive (Trope and
Neter, 1994; Deschepper et al., 2008; Pergert and Lutzen, 2012).
Recent research has demonstrated the psychological beneﬁt of
self-deception at least in the short-term (Chance et al., 2011,
2015). “Hope is a good breakfast”, wrote Bacon (2010), “but it is a
bad supper”. In this context, Weeks et al. (1998) show that those
cancer patients with false optimistic beliefs about their prognosis
tended to choose life-extending therapy over comfort care, even
though the former was aggressive. In the following paragraphs,
we will discuss the biological value of hope in relation with the
maintaining of the self.
Hope is built on conﬁdent expectations and, as the
psychiatrist Adler (1931) studied in depth, goal-seeking is
central for the developing and maintaining of the self.
Hope, such as happy memories, gives human experiences
a particular temporal connection –a web where the moral
agent is consolidated (Treisman and McHugh, 2011). Similarly,
Dennett (1991) has deﬁned the self as a center of narrative
gravity, a powerful ﬁction where eﬃcient ties of coherence
among beliefs, goals, and behavior are provided. We are
a crossroad between past and future, and without future
(or with negative expectancies) the human self is severely
undermined (Dennett, 1991). Therefore, anticipating the future
is critical for adaptive behavior but, more importantly, for
keeping mental balance by defending the self. Hence, we
could assume the existence of some kind of psychological
homeostatic regulation that preserves the logical connections
among beliefs and its subsequent beneﬁt for the person, which
may be deﬁned as the clearest representation of human identity.
Work of several researchers (Wilson, 1998; Damasio, 2010;
Carroll, 2012) assumes the existence of neuropsychological
mechanisms for constituting the conditions under which the
HBS could be implemented and maximized, including defense
systems against potential informational threats. In this context,
the preservation of mind is subsumed beneath a cluster
of homeostatic mechanisms that embrace informational as
well as biological integrity. The relationship between self-
deception and the HBS can be also understood under the
umbrella of a diﬀerent – although complementary – paradigm:
cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger (1957), the
inconsistency between a sensory input and (for example) a
deep-seated belief is psychologically uncomfortable for the
agent, who tends to reduce that dissonance. To do so, they
may avoid situations and incoming information. We note
here similarities with von Hippel and Trivers (2011) theory
of self-deception, and in particular the bias in selecting
the incoming information. Our view of deceiving oneself
to protect the central nodes of the HBS ﬁts well with
Festinger’s (1957) theory. Although a thorough analysis of
the similarities and diﬀerences between his theory and our
proposal is beyond the scope of this article, we would like to
mention that other authors have related cognitive dissonance and
information-avoidance in serious diseases such as cancer (Case
et al., 2005).
The relationship between the distorted high expectancies of
terminal patients, the preservation of the self and the HBS
may be better understood by commenting on two particular
characteristics of the maintenance and defense mechanisms of
the HBS: limited ﬂexibility and goal-oriented inertia. Concerning
the ﬁrst, beliefs are linked to one another in a more or less
strongly coherent way. As Davidson (1980) wrote, “there is no
assigning beliefs to a person one by one”. Instead of considering
beliefs as isolated, it could be more adequate to talk about
web of beliefs or belief system, since they make sense only
in relation with each other. However, the network has to be
suﬃciently adaptable to allow changes and even some degree
of contradiction among beliefs. Considering neural plasticity
and following the web metaphor, Quine and Ullian (1970)
propose a spider model in which HBS would have only a few
nuclear nodes, formed by rigid deep-seated beliefs, and multiple
peripheral areas that may vary with respect to the nuclear beliefs.
Conﬂicts in the latter would be more innocuous, and thus better
tolerated than nuclear tensions, which would compromise the
stability of the entire web and therefore the agent’s psychical
condition. Concerning the goal-oriented inertia, as Korsgaard
(2009) has pointed out , the reason to choose a belief is diﬀerent
from the reason to make choices. We choose beliefs because
they make up what we are: it is thus a psychological need,
which constitutes the agent’s identity and builds the subject’s
unity.
COGNITIVE LOAD IN HBS-RELATED
SELF-DECEPTIONS
The abovementioned HBS traits suggest why bad news about
prognosis implies fatal consequences for the self: ﬁrst, because
it makes a signiﬁcant dent on deep-seated beliefs; and second
because it often destroys the agent’s goals and plans, paralyzing
thus present actions. Coherently, self-deceptions about death
should be classiﬁed as serious deceptions, that is, psychological
strategies to avoid “social context in which sharing the truth
[including with oneself] might prove very costly to individuals in
not meeting their goals” (Walczyk et al., 2014; our text between
square brackets). This perspective may help us clarify the current
controversy about the cognitive load of deceptions. At least in
relation to HBS-related serious self-deceptions, we defend that
they would require a lower cognitive load in diﬀerent ways, as
we will see in the following paragraphs.
First, from a functional point of view, changing one’s own
deep-seated beliefs – facing reality – would imply launching
multiple abilities in order to reconﬁgure a large part of the
whole web of beliefs. Besides, it is reasonable to assume
that, in these multitasking processes, many brain areas are
involved: this would involve a higher metabolic rate, as it is
suggested by the correlation between glucose metabolism and
a successful performance in executive functions (Karlamangla
et al., 2014). In contrast, HBS-related self-deceptions would
have a lower cognitive load, since the self-deceiver does not
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need a previous construction of realistic representations, a
preliminary plan to deceive, or a motor behavior to implement
it.
Second, the relatively low cognitive demand of HBS-related
self-deceptions may be also justiﬁed from a connectionist
approach, i.e., considering the ﬂow of information through
networks, and in particular parallel distributed processing (PDP).
Unlike modular processing (vertical, localized, and domain-
speciﬁc), PDP has cross content domains and is not carried
out in a step-by-step procedure in which representations are
informationally encapsulated (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 1991).
This cognitive resource is also proposed by McCornack et al.
(2014) in the central premise of their IMT2 as the main
characteristic of the speech production system that leads to
deceptive or truthful discourses. The key issue here is that,
assuming the HBS as a web, the modular brain processes and
IMT2 premises, cognitive eﬀort in PDP is shared between a huge
number of nodes that are activated or inhibited simultaneously,
entailing thus higher speed in the management of inputs and
greater energy eﬃciency.
Third, the application of the connectionist approach to
the HBS is also useful to understand the possibility of non-
conscious HBS-related self-deception. In fact, the common
understanding of the HBS assumes its non-conscious nature
(Davidson, 2001). Indeed, the web of beliefs is never entirely
conscious at any given moment, that is, HBS works mainly in
non-conscious levels (Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012).
Once again, this view is supported by IMT2: “because most
of this processing and behavioral production occurs at the
unconscious level, it may very well be the case that so-called
‘decisions’ about deception actually are made prior to conscious
awareness”. Then, a new question arises: are non-conscious self-
deceptions less cognitive demanding than conscious processes?
We strongly believe that a conscious acceptance of a sensory
input that threatens one’s own HBS involves weakening the
self, which leads, in turn, to the necessity of struggling
against fear, stress and anxiety (Thorson and Powell, 1988;
DePaulo et al., 2004). Therefore, following the non-conscious
self-deception seems cognitively lighter than accepting the
threatening truth.
We would like to mention as well two possible limitations
of our proposal: ﬁrst, most self-deceptions – like deceptions
in general – involve handling truthful information, in order
not only to generate ﬁctional but plausible narratives, and also
because they may be generated without prior warning during a
honest thinking process (McCornack, 1997). This means that the
possibility of measuring the cognitive load of an isolated self-
deception is questionable. Second, as we have discussed, cognitive
load of self-deception is very low when this is non-conscious
or involve only mental acts. However, self-deception may also
include other processes such as a behavioral output – telling
others – or the pursuit of a conscious goal. Hence, it is reasonable
to think that cognitive load would increase in thesemore complex
self-deceptions.
Finally, in order to evaluate the cognitive load involved in
HBS-related self-deceptions, it is important to bear in mind the
cultural environment of the agent. Stanley et al. (2008) have
demonstrated multiple attitudes that are implicitly assimilated,
i.e., without conscious intervention, as a consequence of social
inﬂuences, and are correlated with rearrangements of neural
structure. Death plays a fundamental role in several cultures
across history to the extent that, within them, all stages of
human life, to a greater or lesser degree, drawn their signiﬁcance
from such ﬁnal event. One of the possible attitudes toward
this event is preparation (Palmer, 1996), a process akin to
cognitive reappraisal that is known to modulate brain activity
associated with emotional responding (Farb et al., 2010). Thus,
in such social environments, news about one’s own death would
be better assimilated, which means that self-deception would
evoke greater load than facing reality. However, according to
Ariès (1982), death is being forbidden in Western postmodern
society. If he is right, self-deceptions in terminal patients may be
the outcome of a lengthy process of attitudinal assimilation of
cultural predilections. It would be the easy and quickest way of
surviving, at least in the short term.
CONCLUSION
Truth-telling in healthcare is a generally adopted ethic inWestern
countries, even if it entails ending patients’ illusions in cases
of serious illness. Our conclusions here suggest that if deep
beliefs are critical for self-subsistence, then some information
may be more harmful than the adverse consequences of
any deception, especially when individuals do not have the
strength to reconﬁgure a new identity. What is the biggest
concern about death for terminal patients, the thought of
death itself – Heidegger’s “being-for-death” – or the thought
of living an unfamiliar world – transforming the way of
“being-in-the-world”? We think that the second one is a
more exhausting challenge, although some patients may prefer
facing reality at the risk of oedipal madness. Although telling
the truth to patients may mean to respect their autonomy,
serious self-deceptions are not always conscious and voluntary.
Thus, physicians could make patients aware of these defensive
mechanisms that lead to self-deception, unless it incapacitates
patients to make decisions. This poses a dilemma: should the
doctor insist on the patient’s understanding of the truth, or
allow self-deception? This question is at the very base of our
perspective, since not everybody accept a narrative view of
themselves: some people are naturally disposed to conceive
their life in a more fragmented way, without giving such
importance to their past and future (Strawson, 2015). Although
we do not agree with Strawson’s (2015) radical non-narrative
interpretation of the self, we accept that the necessity of keeping
a narrative self may be variable among people. For that reason,
physicians should make an eﬀort to understand values and
beliefs of their patients, and make the appropriate decision in
each case.
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